
The latest conflict has made one reality unmistakably clear. For Gulf oil producers, being reliable suppliers of energy is no longer enough. Ensuring access to that supply has become just as important as producing it, as the Strait of Hormuz remains compromised.
Flows through Hormuz remain well below pre-war levels. According to Kpler data, only 5.8 million barrels per day moved through the strait in June, compared with around 20 million before the conflict. Attacks on Qatari and Saudi-flagged vessels prompted the United States to revoke its waiver on sales of Iranian crude and strike sites in Iran once again, reinforcing that the conflict is far from over and still carries the risk of further escalation.
The memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran never resolved the deep political divide between the two countries. While headlines focused on the waiver for Iranian crude and briefly supported oil prices, industry sources told Kpler there has been limited appetite among buyers to lift Iranian oil because the security environment remains highly volatile.
That assessment was reinforced when US President Donald Trump declared that the ceasefire with Iran was over “as far as I’m concerned” during a press appearance in Ankara, adding, “I don’t want to deal with them anymore.”
Despite these realities, oil prices retreated into the $70s on the assumption that a “mega glut” is emerging. That interpretation overlooks the situation on the ground. The departure of stranded vessels from the strait does not represent a return to normal operations, and regional production has yet to recover to pre-war levels. Countries such as Kuwait and Iraq could require months to restore volumes lost through production shut-ins.
The latest crisis has also revived a long-standing Gulf ambition to reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have spent years investing in export routes that bypass the chokepoint. Recent disruptions have strengthened the case for expanding those alternatives.
The fastest gains would come from existing infrastructure. Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline stretches roughly 1,200 kilometres from the Gulf coast to Yanbu on the Red Sea and is designed to transport about 7 million bpd. Yet export capacity at Yanbu remains closer to 5 million bpd, leaving room for additional storage, terminal upgrades and other investments that could unlock more of the system’s potential. Even so, pipelines are no guarantee of security. Parts of the network were damaged in an Iranian strike, demonstrating that pipelines are just as strategic a target as shipping lanes.

The UAE faces a simpler and potentially faster opportunity. Expanding the Abu Dhabi-Fujairah pipeline would allow more crude to reach the Gulf of Oman without transiting Hormuz. Because the route lies entirely within the federation, it avoids many of the political complications that often undermine cross-border projects.
The more ambitious proposals are also the most difficult. Iraq has long sought export routes beyond the Gulf. Expanding the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan would provide one option, while the proposed Basra-Aqaba pipeline through Jordan would give Iraqi crude direct access to the Red Sea. Both projects continue to face familiar obstacles including financing, regional politics and security risks. Another recurring proposal, reviving the dormant Iraqi pipeline across Saudi Arabia, still depends on political agreements that have repeatedly proved elusive.
The debate is therefore no longer about finding a single alternative to Hormuz. It is about creating redundancy. A network of export routes would allow crude flows to be redirected when one corridor is disrupted, making the system more resilient even if no individual pipeline can match the capacity of the strait.
Building that resilience will not be cheap. New pipelines require years of construction and tens of billions of dollars in investment. They must cross inhospitable terrain and, in many cases, multiple national borders where disputes over ownership, tariffs and operations have derailed projects before they began. There is a reason the Gulf has relatively limited integrated energy infrastructure.
Yet the economic calculation is shifting. Every disruption pushes insurance costs higher, unsettles global markets and reminds exporters that excessive concentration carries its own price. The question is no longer whether bypass routes are expensive. It is whether dependence on Hormuz has become even more costly.
The debate is no longer about whether the Strait of Hormuz can be disrupted. It is about how quickly the global energy system can reduce its dependence on it. Every crisis strengthens the commercial and strategic case for alternative export routes, making investment in pipelines, ports and new shipping corridors easier to justify.
Geography gave Iran one of the world’s most powerful strategic advantages. But every attempt to wield that advantage accelerates the search for alternatives. In geopolitics, leverage is most valuable when it rarely needs to be used. Once it becomes a recurring threat, markets begin pricing in a future without it.
By Amena Bakr, Head of Middle East & OPEC+ Insights, Kpler


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